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1. INTRODUCTION 
Corruption is a complex phenomenon, and its negative political and economic 
consequences have been widely analysed in recent years. Corruption is said to erode trust in 
government and the legitimacy of political institutions (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Bowler 
and Karp, 2004) and also to harm public finances (Hillman, 2004), deter foreign investment 
and trade (Wei, 2000; de Jong and Bogmans, 2010) and reduce growth (Shleyfer and Vishny, 
1993; Mauro, 1995; Méndez and Sepúlveda, 2005). Institutions such as the World Bank 
identify corruption as being the single most important impediment to development. Given the 
potentially devastating impact of corruption, a better understanding of the institutions that 
might help to mitigate it seems to be crucial. One of the main findings from recent studies of 
the institutional determinants of corruption (Treisman, 2000; Lederman et al., 2005) is that 
democracies are less corrupt than other political systems. The key ingredients of democracy, 
including party-based competition, free elections, press freedom, and an independent 
judiciary, are negatively correlated with corruption (see, e.g., Goldsmith, 1999; Besley and 
Burgess, 2002; Adserà et al., 2003; Vaidya, 2005; Alt and Lassen, 2008; Feld and Voigt, 
2003).  
The basic mechanism ensuring democracy works is the capacity voters have to hold 
politicians accountable, ousting them from office if they have evidence of corruption, and 
rewarding honest behaviour with re-election. Yet, most of the empirical studies addressing 
this question report just modest effects of corruption on a candidate’s vote. For example, 
Chang et al. (2010) find that Italian legislators went unpunished during most of the post-war 
period. In a case study conducted in Japan during the same period, Reed (1999) finds that the 
electoral punishment of legislators indicted for corruption was also quite modest. Similar 
results were found by Peters and Welch (1980) in their study of the effects of corruption 
charges on the re-election of candidates to the U.S. House of Representatives. They estimate 
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that candidates accused of corruption during 1968-78 lost on average around 8% of the vote. 
An update of this study for the period 1982-90 (Welch and Hibbing, 1997) found somewhat 
higher results, with an average vote loss of 10%, and lower probabilities of re-election for 
corrupt politicians. In their analysis of the congressional check-kiting scandal in 1992, 
Dimock and Jacobson (1995) find that most incumbents managed to be re-elected, albeit with 
a reduced vote share of around 5%.  
Note that all these studies focus on the behaviour of legislators, with virtually no studies 
having analysed the effect of corruption on the electoral prospects of other officials. In 
particular, the electoral outcomes of mayors, which are the focus of this paper, have been 
neglected1. One prominent exception is the article by Ferraz and Finan (2008) examining 
corrupt mayors in Brazil. They report sizeable electoral consequences when voters are 
provided with conclusive evidence of corruption in the form of federal audits of municipal 
accounts showing diversion of funds. Mayors identified as being corrupt in this way might 
lose from 10 to 30% of their vote share and see their re-election chances reduced by as much 
as 17%. The authors claim that the greater impact reported in their study reflects the fact that 
they use data for proven incidences of corruption. However, Golden (2006) suggests that the 
result might also be due to the direct relationship between ousting a corrupt mayor and 
improving public services, a relationship that is less certain in the case of a legislator than it is 
for a mayor. Our paper aims at contributing to the thin body of evidence describing how 
voters react to corruption at this local level. We believe there is a particular need for this 
evidence, given recent interest in the literature for determining whether accountability can be 
strengthened at the local level (see, e.g., Bardhan, 1997; Hindriks and Lockwood, 2009). 
The literature on the electoral effects of corruption also suggests that the severity of the 
electoral punishment might depend on the attention the media pays to corruption. For instance, 
                                                 
1 A number of papers analyse whether local officials are held accountable for public service performance 
(see, e.g., Brender, 2003, for the case of local governments in Israel, and Berry and Howell, 2007, who 
study school districts in the US). 
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the paper by Chang et al. (2010) finds that Italian legislators were only punished after 
considerable media coverage following a major judicial crackdown during the 11th legislature2. 
At the local level, Ferraz and Finan (2008) find that the punishment of Brazilian mayors 
found corrupt by federal audits is much higher (the probability of being ousted rising to 30%) 
in municipalities with a radio station.3 Note, however, that none of these papers is really able 
to measure the degree of attention that the media devoted to each corruption case. As we 
explain below, we seek to improve on this by considering not only the effect of corruption 
scandals, but also the effect of the amount of press coverage.  
Drawing on Spanish data for the 2007 and 2003 municipal elections, the present study 
analyses the effects of corruption on local electoral outcomes. Taking press reports published 
between 1996 and 2009, we construct a novel database on corruption scandals and news 
related to bribe-taking in exchange for amendments to land use plans that allow more 
development to take place. The main source of this data is the ‘Fundación Alternativas’, a 
Spanish think tank, which in 2007 commissioned a survey that recorded all corruption 
scandals as reported by national, regional and local newspapers during the period 2000-2007. 
This database was complemented by a bibliographical news search for the years before and 
after this period. Thus, the database contains 520 municipalities with at least one report of 
corruption during the period June 1999 to May 2007 (which covers the two terms eventually 
analysed here) and 5,144 news stories about corruption. The richness of the database allows 
                                                 
2 Brender (2003) and Berry and Howell (2007), in their respective analyses of the effects of public service 
performance of voting in Israel and the US, also find that punishment only occurs during terms with wide 
media coverage of the issue. 
3 Other papers focus on the effects of media coverage on accountability, but not specifically on corruption. 
For example, Strömberg (2004) finds that US counties with a radio station received more New Deal funds, 
and Snyder and Strömberg (2010) find that in House districts with more press coverage voters are better 
informed about the activities of their representative and, in turn, representatives tend to work harder for the 
district. A few papers study the relationship between media coverage and corruption. See, e.g., Svaleryd 
and Vlachos (2009) on the effect of media penetration on rent-extraction by Swedish municipalities, and 
Pugglisi and Snyder (2008) on partisan bias in the coverage of political scandals in Italy.  
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us not only to evaluate the average impact of corruption scandals on voting outcomes, but also 
to assess the role of press reporting (e.g. number of news stories, type of newspaper). 
There are several reasons that make the Spanish case interesting. First, local corruption 
was not an issue before the elections we analyse here. The sudden emergence of corruption in 
Spain’s local political life is the result of the recent boom in construction, which increased 
rewards for such behaviour. Second, and related to this, local corruption in Spain typically 
involves amendments to land use regulations, a type of corruption rarely studied before (see 
Cai et al., 2009, for an exception). In Spain, municipalities are responsible for passing very 
detailed land use plans, which fix the exact amount of land for development in a given period, 
and the conditions of this development. The shortage of vacant land (and, more generally, 
restrictive regulations), coupled with a huge demand shock, provides developers with 
incentives to offer bribes to local officials in exchange for amendments to the plan that will 
permit more construction.  
There are a number of specific traits related to this type of corruption that could 
potentially affect our results. First, it is a highly homogeneous type of corruption, a feature 
not typically found in empirical studies which tend to examine very different types of 
violation, some related closely with the concept of corruption (e.g. bribes, procurement fraud, 
and resource diversion) and others more further removed (e.g. financial irregularities, poor 
management, as well as other types of crime). Second, the nature of the corrupt act, entailing 
the modification of a regulation without directly affecting the local budget, means it might be 
perceived differently by voters to more traditional theft-related violations. Indeed, more lax 
land use regulations do have some effects that might be valued positively by certain voters, 
blurring the negative perception of corruption4. For instance, politicians accepting bribes in 
                                                 
4 In fact, there is a temptation to consider corruption of this kind as positive, since it is the mechanism by 
which inefficient regulations can be passed (see Fischel, 1985, for a discussion). Note, however, that even 
if this were true (something that is not clear once considerations regarding the preservation of open space 
are included), the mere fact that the act of corruption is contrary to democratically established laws and 
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exchange for permitting more development might be seen by some voters as entrepreneurs 
taking part of the profit they secure for the community in terms of higher economic 
opportunities related to this new development. However, as we show below (section 2.2), on 
average, Spanish voters have a negative perception of corruption. 
Third, Spanish local corruption scandals received wide press coverage during these years, 
with news appearing in the main newspapers every day for extended periods. Despite this, 
there is anecdotal evidence that some corrupt mayors were re-elected and even improved their 
vote shares. Newspaper opinions on these cases reflect the popular wisdom that ‘Spanish 
voters do tolerate corruption’ 5 . Local majoritarian elections with closed lists, a lack of 
independent media, low levels of transparency in local policy-making (see Transparency 
International, 2007), clientelism and patronage networks6, and a political culture of tolerance 
to fraud (see, e.g., Fundación Alternativas, 20087) have often been invoked to justify these 
results. Thus, Spain seems a good testing ground to check the validity of some of these claims.  
We use the corruption data to estimate an incumbent’s vote share equation for the 2007 
and 2003 municipal elections. Most previous studies on this topic fail to account for the 
omission of popularity shocks. We use ‘difference-in-differences’ (DD) to attenuate this 
problem. Our DD estimation compares the increase in the vote share for the incumbent in two 
consecutive elections relative to the increase experienced by the previous incumbent in 
                                                                                                                                                        
regulations means that it can have profound effects on the quality of democracy. In fact, in Spain, recent 
reports warn against the effects of the upsurge in cases of local corruption on trust in government, electoral 
turnout, and participation in public affairs (see Fundación Alternativas 2010). 
5 For example, a special report on corruption cases in Andalucía (a region in the south of Spain) by El País 
(a leading national newspaper) in 2007 was headlined as ‘The polls forgive accused officials’ (‘Las urnas 
perdonan a los imputados’, El País, 5/29/2007). The newspaper reported that 30 of the 40 officials facing 
charges of corruption before the 2003 local elections were re-elected.  
6 A recent article in El País expressed this in the following way: “Corrupt politicians are those that don’t 
reach office alone but that are able to colonize the administration with the members of a clientelistic 
network, and this is quite easy in Spain” (‘La paradoja de la corrupción’, El País, 05/04/2010). 
7 See also Hillman and Swank (2000), Paldam (2002), and Becker et al. (2009) for papers that analyse the 
effect of political culture on government corruption. 
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municipalities with and without cases of corruption. Our results for the 2007 elections8 
suggest that the mean vote loss after a corruption scandal is around 4% and that this effect is 
larger in cases receiving wide reporting in the newspapers (up to 9%). The impact in the 2003 
elections is much smaller and our findings are less precise. To account for the possibility that 
newspaper reporting might just capture the seriousness of a scandal, we also report results 
(using a reduced sample for the 2007 elections) regarding the impact of reporting when 
controlling for judicial charges. We find that prosecuted incumbents lose up to 12% of the 
vote, and that even when controlling for seriousness, press reporting has a significant effect 
(incumbents that have not been charged but whose cases have been reported widely still lose 
up to 4% of their vote).   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide the basic 
background to the Spanish case, include details about the construction of the database, and 
describe the recent upsurge in corruption and the role that land use planning has played in it. 
Section three discusses our empirical strategy and presents the results and section four 
concludes. 
 
2. CORRUPTION IN SPANISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
2.1. Measuring local corruption: the database 
Empirical studies of corruption use at least three different approaches to obtain the data 
they require. Most use either perceptions of corruption (e.g. Wei, 2000; Alesina and Weder, 
2002) or draw on data from public records relating to corruption charges (see, e.g., Glaeser 
and Saks, 2006; Alt and Lassen, 2008). Given the difficulties of gathering data of this kind, 
both for long periods and at the local level, some authors have used bibliographical and/or 
                                                 
8 Our data show that local corruption scandals first emerged during the 1999-2003 term, but that their 
intensity reached its peak before the 2007 elections. Thus, we focus our empirical analysis primarily on the 
2007 elections, and summarise our main findings for the 2003 polls.  
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internet-guided searches (Glaeser and Goldin, 2004; Saiz and Simonshon, 2011). Besides 
overcoming problems of availability, this approach has a number of additional advantages: it 
accounts for corruption only if voters had access to information about it, and the number of 
news reports or citations provides a natural way to measure both the occurrence of corruption 
and its intensity. 
We, therefore, take this approach in this paper. We had access to a database of corruption 
scandals compiled by the Fundación Alternativas (2007), a Spanish think-tank. In 2007, 
shortly after the surge in corruption scandals that occurred in 2006, this organization 
commissioned a survey of local corruption in order to gauge quantitatively the actual 
relevance of the phenomenon. They hired a journalist in each Spanish province with the task 
of compiling all corruption related news stories involving municipalities in the province 
between 1 January 2000 and 1 February 2007 appearing in national, regional or local 
newspapers, and that were related to this period or to the past. The search found 663 cases of 
corruption occurring since 1991.  
Before deciding to use this database we ran various verifications of its reliability. 
Fundación Alternativas has close links with the socialist party (PSOE), and we were 
concerned about a possible partisan bias of its database. Our suspicions were roused by the 
fact that the main left-wing newspaper in Spain (‘El País’) began a crusade in 2006 against 
corruption, with daily news reports on corruption scandals involving the main right-wing 
party (Partido Popular, PP). To check for this possibility, we compared this database with 
another one compiled by the right-wing newspaper ‘El Mundo’9. The comparison showed that 
the proportion of corruption scandals by parties was not statistically different in the two 
                                                 
9 This database covers the same period as that of the Fundación Alternativas (2007) and we find that the 
number of reported scandals is similar. However, it only provides information as to whether a scandal 
happened or not, but says nothing about the number of news reports it attracted and sheds little light on the 
other case details that we use in this paper. 
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databases10. It seems, therefore, that Fundación Alternativas’ database (2007) is not biased in 
its coverage of the scandals involving different parties. Indeed, in the description offered of 
the procedure employed in its data gathering, the institution states that the choice of 
journalists compiling the cases in each province included people working for both left and 
right-wing media outlets. 
A further concern is the coverage provided by our database for the pre-2000 period and 
for the year 2007 given that the local elections took place in June of that year. Just 26 of the 
cases identified occurred before 2000, which could be due to the fact that most news reports 
were published near the date when the corruption occurred or to the fact that there were 
virtually no cases of corruption before that year. Moreover, just nine cases occurred in 2007, 
which is the result of the fact that only one month was examined in that year. Since the period 
we are interested in runs from May 1995 to June 2007, we completed the database with 
internet-guided searches in MyNews (http://mynews.es), a paid digital information 
management service covering all national and many of the regional newspapers 11 . We 
screened the periods that run from 1 January 1996 (when the service’s coverage starts) to 1 
January 2000 (the starting date for the other survey), and from 1 February 2007 to 1 
November 2009 (the day this search was performed). We conducted a search for news reports 
containing the word ‘corrupción urbanística’ (i.e. corruption related to land planning) and 
each of the more than 8,000 names of the Spanish municipalities. We found 20 additional 
cases prior to 2000 and 203 post 1 February 2007, 131 of which occurred before the June 
                                                 
10 These data and the statistical test have been omitted for reasons of space but are available from the 
authors upon request. 
11 The service covers just a few of the local papers for the pre-2000 period. However, only 7% of the cases 
in the database from Fundación Alternativas were covered solely by local newspapers (and not by regional 
and national ones as well), making this problem relatively unimportant. Further, as our results show, local 
news is far less relevant than national and regional reports in the eyes of the voters (see next section). 
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2007 elections12. Thus, the overall number of cases in the database is 814, while the number 
of cases during the two terms of office studied (July 1999 to May 2007) is 696 (see Table 1). 
[Insert Table 1] 
Both databases also provide data on the publication date of each news item. The number 
of scandals during these two terms, defined as cases for which at least one news items was 
published during the term of office, is 565 (see Table 1). This number is lower than the 
number of corruption cases based on occurrence, because some of the cases were reported in 
the term following that in which the corruption was perpetrated. Given that we are interested 
in how incumbents are affected by the corruption scandals in which they were involved, we 
focus on scandals rather than on cases. Moreover, in our empirical analysis we do not use 
scandals that affected parties not in power (i.e. that had already been ousted) or that affected 
incumbents that had been involved in a corruption scandal in the previous term (see next 
section for an explanation). The numbers in parentheses in Table 1 indicate the number of 
scandals remaining once these two classes are removed.  This reduces the number of scandals 
during these two terms to 453, 212 during the 1999-2003 term and 241 during the 2003-07 
term of office.  
The database also contains the number of news reports related to each of these cases and 
which were published during the term-of-office of the incumbent implicated in the scandal. 
The number of news reports totals 5144, with an average of ten news items per scandal. For 
nearly 30% of the cases there is only one news report, for 33% the number of reports is 
greater than one but less than five, 12% of them were mentioned in between five and ten news 
items, while 25% of the cases were written about in more than ten news stories. The database 
also informs us as to where these scandals were reported, that is in national, regional or local 
newspapers. National newspapers reported 46% of the scandals, regional newspapers 63%, 
                                                 
12 As a robustness check, we also searched for news reports containing just the word “corrupción”, but we 
did not find additional cases. 
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and local newspapers just 23%. The sum of these percentages is greater than 100 because 
most cases were covered by more than one type of newspaper: 20% of the scandals were 
covered by both national and regional newspapers, 10% by regional and local, 6.5% by 
national and local, and just 3% by the three types of publication at the same time. The average 
number of news reports per scandal in national, regional and local newspapers was 9.4, 5.8 
and 2.4, respectively. 
The cases of corruption included in Fundación Alternativas’ (2007) database were 
screened by a group of researchers, lawyers, and experts on land use regulations to verify that 
all the cases included were relevant and also to aid in the classification of the legal violations. 
For a sub-sample of 133 municipalities presenting cases of corruption during the 2003-07 
term13, these experts were able to classify them (undertaking complementary research in 
judicial files where necessary) according to their seriousness. These data allow us to separate 
cases with corruption charges (58% of the scandals) from those situations where the 
opposition parties or other organizations went to the press with alleged accusations of corrupt 
behaviour by the incumbent, without any judicial action. Cases with corruption charges are 
defined as situations in which the politician’s name appears in an attorney’s investigative 
report or indictment. Moreover, the database allows us to classify the cases with corruption 
charges into: (i) cases already filed but with no conviction having being made (28% of the 
cases), which most frequently involve situations in which the attorney initiated an 
investigation but he and/or the judge concluded that there was insufficient evidence to go to 
trial; (ii) cases involving a formal denouncement from an opposition party or any other 
organization (23%), (iii) cases in which the attorney decided to initiate an investigation but 
where the case has yet to go to trial (13%); (iv) cases in which there has been a formal 
                                                 
13 See Fundación Alternativas (2008) for a description of the procedure used to build this sub-sample. 
Its size is the result of various difficulties encountered in gathering more detailed data. The values of 
the main covariates are, however, more similar than they are for the whole sample (results available 
upon request). 
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accusation by the attorney and which are awaiting trial (32%) and, finally, (v) cases that 
result in a conviction (4%).  
2.2. Descriptive analysis: the recent surge in corruption  
In the first two decades following the restoration of Spain’s democratic local 
governments (1979-99) not much concern was expressed in the media, among the political 
elite, or the population in general to the lack of accountability or possible cases of corruption. 
This does not mean that there was no corruption in this period (in fact, some commentators 
warned about this possibility at a very early stage, see, e.g. Nieto, 1997), but simply that the 
severity of the problem and/or the probability of it becoming an issue depended on individual 
circumstances. First, local corruption typically appears in periods when the housing market is 
booming, and this was only the case from 1985 to 1991, and from 1995 to 2006. Second, 
during the first years of the newly elected local governments, the main concerns were with 
developing their powers and solving the longstanding deficits in local public infrastructure. 
Third, during part of this period (i.e. 1991-1996, coinciding with the Felipe González’s last 
PSOE government, see Jiménez and Caínzos, 2003) the level of corruption in national 
government and the public perception of this reached very high levels, effectively hiding what 
might have been happening locally.  
The situation began to change after 1995, with the switch in the housing market 
situation, but it did not really take off until 1999. As shown in Table 1, before 1999, there 
were just 46 cases of corruption, and just 20 of these were reported by the press during this 
period. The number of cases jumped to 288 during the term 1999-2003, with 227 of them 
being reported during this same term. Corruption did not go into decline after this, with 408 
cases occurring during the 2003-07 term and 307 scandals. During the period that runs from 
the June 2007 elections to November 2009, 72 new cases appeared, but most of the scandals 
reported during this period referred to cases that had occurred in previous terms (131 out of a 
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total of 203 scandals). The reduction in the rate of new cases might be related to the crisis in 
the real estate market, which began in 2007 and became more intense in the years that 
followed. Overall, the numbers suggest that corruption first appeared after 1995 but that it did 
not become an issue until the 1999 elections. It also seems that the intensity was much higher 
before the 2007 elections than in the previous term. The evolution in the number of news 
stories (not reported here) shows exactly the same pattern.  
[Insert Figures  1 & 2] 
Data on the perception of corruption among Spanish voters corroborate this impression. 
Figure 1 shows the evolution in the percentage of people that cite ‘corruption and fraud’ as 
one of the three worst problems faced by the country during the period September 2001 to 
December 2008 (Source: CIS Barometer, several years). The negative perception of 
corruption among voters follows a similar pattern to that related to corruption scandals and 
news, increasing some months before the 2003 elections and, recording a higher intensity and 
many peaks during the three-year period that precedes the 2007 polls. This evidence suggests 
that we can expect the impact of corruption scandals on the vote to be greater in the 2007 than 
in the 2003 elections, although it is also plausible that some punishment had already been 
meted out at the 2003 polls. 
What about prior elections? Figure 2 shows the evolution in the percentage of people 
that cite ‘politicians and parties’ as one of the three worst problems faced by the country 
during the period January 1995 to December 2008 (Source: CIS Barometer, several years)14. 
Note from this figure that the percentage of people citing ‘politicians and parties’ as a 
problem dropped abruptly from a very high level (i.e. 22% of the population) before the 
general elections held in March 1996 to just 2% before the June 1999 local elections. The 
                                                 
14 This database does not provide information on the ‘corruption and fraud’ response before September 
2001, so we have to rely on the ‘politicians and parties’ question for that period. Note, however, that the 
profiles of both series appear to be very similar for the period September 2001 to December 2008, 
suggesting that people consider the terms ‘politicians’ and ‘corruption’ to be fairly interchangeable. 
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high level of awareness of corruption before 1996 reflects the corruption scandals that 
affected the last PSOE government led by Felipe González. Corruption was a key issue during 
the 1996 electoral campaign but progressively disappeared from the public arena after the 
socialists were ousted from government. Note also that the percentage of people citing 
politicians as a problem continued to drop after the 1999 local elections, and only started to 
peak once more in mid-2000. This reinforces our belief that corruption was not a problem 
prior to 1999, and justifies our specific focus on the 2003 and, especially, on the 2007 
elections. 
2.3. Corruption causes: land use regulations  
Spanish commentators offer several explanations for the recent surge in corruption in 
local government, ranging from the existence of a culture of tolerance of corruption (see 
Fundación Alternativas, 2008, for a discussion), low levels of transparency in local decision-
making (Transparency International, 2007), to the system of party financing (Nieto, 1997). 
However, the fact that most local corruption scandals involve bribes received in exchange for 
amendments to the land use plans suggests that the specific traits of this type of regulation 
have been important in this surge, especially when combined with the massive boom in real 
estate.  
Land use regulations in Spain adhere to an extremely interventionist and highly rigid 
system (Riera et al., 1991; Riera, 2000). A key characteristic is that, although an individual 
might own the land, the government is empowered to control and implement all processes of 
urban development. The main tool employed by the government for doing this is town 
planning, which is essentially a municipal responsibility. Municipalities draw up a ‘General 
Plan’, which provides a three-way land classification: built-up land, developable land (where 
future development is allowed), and non-developable land  (the rest of the territory, where the 
development process is strictly prohibited). The ‘General Plan’ includes very detailed 
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regulations regarding many other aspects: land zoning (residential, commercial, industrial), 
maximum floor-to-area ratio for each plot, reservation of land for streets, green spaces and 
public facilities, etc.  
The existence of a ‘development border’, a line between plots of land on which 
developers are allowed to build and plots where development is prohibited, is a key feature of 
Spain’s land regulation system. In periods of high demand this border creates a rent 
differential which might fuel the bribes developers are willing to pay to local politicians in 
exchange for shifting this border to their advantage15. The higher this rent differential is, the 
stronger are the incentives for developers to provide bribes to local officials in exchange for a 
displacement of the border, which converts more land from a rural to a potentially 
developable use (see Solé-Ollé and Viladecans, 2010 16 ). Discretionary decision-making 
regarding other regulatory characteristics (e.g. the floor-to-area ratio) can create the same type 
of incentives. 
In addition to discretionary decision-making, the lack of transparency and the shortage 
of channels of democratic participation in planning decisions are also a major concern in 
Spain. In theory, the ‘General Plan’ has an eight-year duration, but land classification can be 
readily modified by a majority vote in the municipal council17. The amendment plan, known 
as a ‘Partial Plan’, is also a legally binding document. A number of participation and 
transparency requirements apply to facilitate scrutiny by the residents, who can seek to 
change the document if they so wish. These requirements are stricter in the case of the initial 
                                                 
15 The idea that a government monopoly in the control of regulations can create rents and that these can in 
turn give incentives for corrupt behaviour can be found in many prominent studies on corruption (see, e.g., 
Rose-Ackerman, 1978, and Ades and Di Tella, 1998). 
16  See Glaeser et al. (2005) and Hilbert and Robert-Nicoud (2010) for other papers that discuss the 
lobbying engaged in by developers to influence zoning decisions. 
17 In Spain, municipal elections are held every four years. A proportional system with closed lists is used to 
elect the council members. The council then elects a mayor who in turn selects the executive from among 
the councillors of the party/parties providing him with support. The mayor has agenda-setting powers but 
important decisions (for example, the budget and the amendment of urban plans) have to be approved by a 
council majority.  
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introduction of the ‘General Plan’, but actual degree of transparency of the system is very 
much dependent on the will of local politicians. To implement the plan, local officials can 
resort to a variety of means to introduce desired amendments, without these changes having to 
come under much scrutiny from residents or the media18.  
Many recent cases of corruption in Spain are consistent with these explanations. Thus, 
there are a large number of cases involving local officials that wrongfully allowed huge tracts 
of land to be developed, that amended the land use plan so as to permit higher construction 
densities in already developed land, or that allowed building in places where it had been 
previously prohibited (Fundación Alternativas, 2007). Many of the cases are also related to 
questionable contracts between developers and the city council, as a recent report has 
identified (Transparency International, 2007). Finally, in some cases corruption arises because 
land owned by the municipality is sold at below market prices or because payments made by 
developers for basic infrastructure are lower than those provided for under the law19. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
3.1. Dependent variable, period and sample 
The purpose of this analysis is to estimate the effect of reports of corruption scandals 
involving an incumbent mayor, during a given term-of-office, on that incumbent’s vote share 
at the following local elections. We analyse the vote for the incumbent party or parties, but 
not the vote for specific candidates, since our database does not provide this information. 
However, only a few of the candidates involved in corruption scandals or allegations of 
scandal chose not to run again or were forced by their parties to stand down. For example, in 
the 2007 elections just 19 corrupt candidates did not run again (see Fundación Alternativas, 
                                                 
18 This is the case, for example, of the contractual arrangements made between local governments and 
developers (the so-called ‘Convenios Urbanísticos’), which are permitted under Spanish law. Such 
contracts might modify the status of a plot, its floor-to-area ratio, or involve the renegotiation of 
developers’ fees.  
19 This type of corruption is similar to that described by Cai et al. (2009) in Chinese land market auctions. 
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2008) 20 . The 2007 results (available upon request) do not change if we exclude these 
municipalities from the analysis. We have no information regarding the number of candidates 
who stood down at the 2003 elections, but the picture presumably differs little.  
Since a substantial percentage of municipalities are governed by coalitions (34% and 
32% in the 1999-2003 and 2003-07 terms, respectively), our dependent variable is constructed 
as the sum of votes for all the parties in the government team (including the mayor’s party, 
which is the one receiving most votes in the vast majority of cases, and its partners) over the 
total number of votes (recorded by parties both in and out of government). The average 
incumbent’s vote share was around 55%, both in 2003 and 2007 and both for majority parties 
and coalitions21 (see Table 2 for data sources).  
Here, we focus on the share of the incumbents vote at the two local elections (i.e. those 
of 2007 and 2003) that may well have been affected by the surge in number of corruption 
scandals. As reported in the previous section, it seems that media and electorate concern about 
corruption reached a peak before the 2007 elections, while the effect was less apparent in 
2003 and certainly non-existent at earlier elections (1999 and 1995). For this reason, we pay 
more attention to the 2007 elections, albeit we also present results for the 2003 polls. In all 
circumstances, we believe that the evolution over time of this phenomenon justifies the 
separate treatment of the two elections. 
[Insert Table 2] 
In our analysis we compare the municipalities that experienced a corruption scandal for 
the first time during the term analysed (either 1999-2003 or 2003-07) with those that did not 
experience a corruption scandal in the previous terms (i.e. 1995-99 and 1999-2003 in the case 
                                                 
20 This report speculates as to the causes of the decision not to stand down, suggesting that a decision to 
stand down is an implicit acceptance by the party of corruption. Moreover, in some cases, the party lacks 
any disciplinary measures that might impede a candidate from standing for election in representation of a 
different party, in which case it could cause vote losses to the incumbent’s party.  
21 In the case of coalitions, the average vote share of the mayor’s party was 40% and that of the partners 
was 15%. 
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of the 2007 elections, and 1995-99 in the case of the 2003 polls). This means that our ‘treated’ 
group does not include the municipalities that experienced corruption during this term or in 
the previous one, and nor does it include those municipalities that reported a corruption 
scandal that did not affect the current incumbent. The reason for these exclusions is that 
corruption might have a different impact on the vote after having been experienced in the 
previous term, and this might also depend on whether the incumbent was ousted or not. Our 
‘control’ group also excludes all municipalities that have experienced a case of corruption in 
the past so as to guarantee that we compare only those municipalities experiencing this 
problem for the first time with municipalities that have never faced such a problem. As a 
result, for the 2007 elections, the ‘treated’ group comprises 241 municipalities (see Table 1) 
while the control group comprises 4360 (from a total of 4601 municipalities)22.  In the 2003 
analysis, we have 4732 municipalities (212 ‘treated’ and 4655 ‘controls’).  
3.2. Empirical strategy 
Estimating the effects of corruption scandals on the incumbents’ vote share is not 
straightforward since cases of corruption seem more likely in municipalities where the 
popularity of the incumbent is high. Failure to account for this will bias negatively our 
estimates. We deal with this problem by adopting two methods: (i) OLS with control 
variables, & (ii) ‘Difference-in-differences’ (DD). 
OLS with control variables. In this first approach, we use a cross-section of data to 
estimate by OLS a separate vote share equation for each of the two elections, according to the 
following linear specification (see, e.g., Healy and Malhotra, 2009, for a similar approach): 
                                          iikj
t
ikji
t
ikj ZC εγδβα ++++= −1VdV                                           (1) 
                                                 
22 Spain has more than 8,000 municipalities, but most are quite small. The control group is smaller than this 
because of data gathering problems. We believe that our control group is fairly representative of the 
population, since it includes the vast majority of municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants and a 
number of tests run on the remaining part of the sample show that the average values in the sample and the 
population (for the few variables which are available in both cases) are quite similar.  
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where iCd  is a dummy equal to one if there has been a corruption scandal in the municipality 
during the term-of-office preceding the election (either in 2007 or 2003). We also estimate the 
model with alternative measures of corruption (e.g. number of news reports), but for ease of 
presentation we refer only to the corruption scandal dummy in this section. V is the 
incumbent’s vote share, while the sub-indexes indicate that votes were obtained in 
municipality i, belonging to region k, by party j, and the super-indexes inform that the votes 
were obtained by the incumbent at the electoral contests t and t-1 (i.e., 2007 and 2003, for the 
2007 elections, or 2003 and 1999, for the 2003 elections). The incumbent’s vote share in the 
previous election controls for differences across municipalities derived from voters’ historical 
attachment to a given political party (see Solé-Ollé & Viladecans, 2010). The δkj are Region × 
Party fixed effects, accounting for regional popularity differentials between parties. Its 
inclusion is justified by the fact that local elections in Spain can be seen partly as functioning 
as by-elections for regional and national polls. This means that when the popularity of a party 
falls regionally or nationally, so does its vote share at local elections (see, e.g., Bosch and 
Solé-Ollé, 2007a and 2007b). The intensity of these side effects often differs from region to 
region, so we allow these effects to differ across regions and parties. iZ  is a vector of controls, 
including a dummy indicating whether the incumbent at t was also incumbent at t-1, a dummy 
indicating whether the government is a coalition, and the growth during the term in 
unemployment and in population. These last two variables have been included to account for 
the possibility that voters punish poor economic performance and/or dislike the possible 
adverse social and/or environmental effects of excessive growth. Both variables are 
potentially correlated with corruption, since our corruption measures are related to bribe-
taking in exchange of permitting additional growth (which could be both correlated with new 
jobs and environmental damage). In addition to these variables, we also discuss the results 
obtained when expanding the set of controls to include population size dummies, property tax 
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increase, and increases in current spending, investment and debt (see Table 2 for definitions 
and sources). iε  is a random error term with the usual properties. 
Difference-in-differences (DD). There are, however, some differences in popularity that 
might be municipality-specific and that are, therefore, difficult to capture with the lagged 
incumbents’ vote share or the Region × Party dummies. For example, in some places the 
incumbency advantage might be higher than in others (i.e. in some places there is a higher 
probability that an incumbent that obtained a given vote share in the past elections will be 
ousted from government). If these differences are constant in time, they can be controlled by 
the inclusion of a municipality fixed effect, iφ , in the equation:  
                                   ititkjti
t
ikjtit
t
ikjt ZC εγδφβα +++++= −1VdV                                            (2) 
Note that now we allow the Region × Party effects also to vary by election. To eliminate 
the municipality fixed effect, we need access to the data of at least one other election. Since 
we also have information for the 1999 and 1995 local elections, we are able to use two cross-
sections for each election. For the 2007 local elections, we have the 2003-07 and 1999-2003 
cross-sections. Note, moreover, that given the definition of the ‘control group’ (see previous 
section), itCd =0 for all the municipalities in 1999-2003
23 . First-differencing over two 
consecutive terms, the estimated equation is just:  
                                    ititkjt
t
ikjtit
t
ikjt ZC εγδβα Δ+Δ++Δ+=Δ −1VdV                                     (3) 
In this context, the interpretation of the ‘difference-in-differences’ estimate is that β is 
the effect on the incumbents’ vote share between two consecutive elections of experiencing a 
corruption scandal for the first time, compared with municipalities where this did not happen 
and where it had never happened in the past. Obviously, since we control here for Region × 
                                                 
23 We proceed in a similar way in the case of the 2003 local elections, using the 1999-2003 and the 1995-99 
cross sections. 
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Party × Election effects, this effect is measured with respect to the increase in the 
incumbents’ vote share in municipalities of the same region and controlled by the same party. 
The DD estimates of equation (3) will be unbiased whenever there are no uncontrolled 
municipality × election popularity shocks. If, for example, more popular incumbents tend to 
also to be more corrupt (see, e.g., Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2008), then the effect of corruption 
on the vote could be biased downwards. A way of addressing this problem is to use an 
alternative control group, namely the municipalities in which we know cases of corruption 
occurred in the same term, but which were not reported until the following one (see, e.g. 
Ferraz and Finan, 2008). There are 62 and 101 such municipalities for the 1999-2003 and 
2003-07 terms (see Table 1), respectively. This procedure would completely eliminate this 
type of bias, since we would be comparing the electoral results of corrupt municipalities 
where corruption went unnoticed before the elections (because the press failed to report it) 
with the electoral results of municipalities which are also corrupt (and thus supposedly similar) 
but where the press did report the cases of corruption before the election and, thus, a scandal 
occurred. 
However, this procedure is not free of problems. The main reason is that, since our 
corruption data comprise cases reported by the press, it is conceivable that lower vote margins 
lead to more reporting (see, e.g., Snyder and Strömberg 2010). If this is the case, the 
estimated effect using the not-reported as corrupt control group will be biased upwards. 
Nevertheless, we also report these results, since their comparison with those obtained when 
using the first control group (non-corrupt municipalities) might also be informative. For 
instance, let us assume that the first type of bias (more corruption with more popularity) 
dominates the second (more reporting with more popularity) when using the non-corrupt 
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municipalities as a control group24. In this case, the estimates obtained when using the non-
corrupt and the not-reported as corrupt, respectively, as control groups are the lower and 
upper bounds for the true effect of corruption on the vote. The usefulness of this approach 
depends on these bounds not being very far apart from each other. As we show in the results 
section, the DD estimates with the not-reported as corrupt control group are higher than those 
with the non-corrupt control group, confirming our expectations. Since the difference 
between the two estimates is not large, we are confident that our estimates are not severely 
biased. 
3.3. Results 
Tables 3 to 7 present the results of the estimation of the effects of corruption scandals on 
incumbents’ votes. Table 3 presents the main OLS and DD results for the 2007 elections 
using just the dC dummy as a measure of corruption. Table 4 shows these DD results for the 
2007 elections when adding the number of news reports to the equation. Table 5 shows how 
these results change when judicial charges are added. Table 6 presents a summary of the OLS 
and DD results for the alternative control group. Table 7 shows the main results for the 2003 
elections.  
[Insert Table 3] 
Main OLS and DD results for the 2007 elections. Columns (i) to (iv) of Table 3 show 
the OLS results for the effect of the incidence of a corruption scandal (dC=1) when adding: (i) 
only the lagged incumbent’s vote, (ii) Region×Party fixed effects, (iii) control variables, and 
(iv) both Region×Party fixed effects and control variables. Columns (v) to (viii) show the DD 
results when respectively adding the same sets of controls as above for OLS. The OLS 
estimates with no controls suggest that a corruption scandal results in just a 2.1% fall in the 
incumbent’s vote. The impact rises to 2.3% when adding the control variables, to 2.7% with 
                                                 
24 As shown below, when including different kinds of control, the estimates using the non-corrupt 
control group always go up, suggesting the first type of bias dominates. 
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the Region×Party fixed effects and to 2.8% when adding all the controls. The DD results are 
higher than the OLS ones (3.8% vs. 2.8% when all the controls are included), which is 
consistent with omitted popularity being positively correlated with corruption. Note also that 
the DD results do not change greatly when the different sets of controls are included. 
Region×Party fixed effects seem to control quite well for omitted popularity, especially in the 
OLS case (i.e. when municipality fixed effects are not taken into account). With the exception 
of Population growth in the DD equations, several control variables included are statistically 
significant and their effects are in line with our expectations. Of particular interest is the fact 
that voters seem to punish Unemployment growth. However, the inclusion of this variable and 
the other controls in the vote equation has no effect on the corruption coefficient, especially in 
the DD case. 
[Insert Table 4] 
Additional DD results for 2007: number of news reports. Table 4 presents the DD 
results when other measures based on the number of news reports are added to the equation. 
Columns (i) to (iii) explore the effects of including news report counts, while columns (iv) to 
(vi) analyse the effects of these reports having been published in different types of newspaper 
(national, regional or local). The results in columns (i) and (ii) show that both the incidence of 
a scandal and the intensity of newspaper reporting of this scandal matter. The estimates in 
column (i) suggest that an incumbent implicated in an average scandal measured in terms of 
the number of news reports (i.e. ten during the 2003-07 term) will lose 2.8% of the vote 
following publication of the first report and an additional 2% as a result of total press 
coverage, giving a total vote loss of 4.8%. Column (ii) seeks a possible non-linear effect of 
the number of news reports, using dummies that recognise thresholds of more than five, ten 
and twenty reports. Here, the base category is a corruption case with fewer than five press 
reports. We find that publication of more than five reports (but fewer than ten) does not make 
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any difference, but that publication of more than ten news reports results in a significant 
additional vote loss. The publication of more than twenty reports does not make any 
difference, once a scandal has been written about in more than ten news stories25. It seems, 
therefore, that the ten news report threshold best defines a scandal receiving substantial 
coverage by the press. This means that for the 25% of scandals in the sample regarding which 
more than ten news reports were published, the incumbents’ vote loss is much higher than in 
the rest of cases, rising to 8.8% (i.e. 2.7%+6.1%, see column (iii)).  
Columns (iv) to (vi) display the results obtained when splitting the corruption scandals 
and news reports according to the type of newspaper (national, regional and local). In column 
(iv), the base category is corruption scandals reported by regional newspapers. The results 
suggest that scandals that were reported by national or local newspapers as well do not have a 
stronger effect on the incumbents’ vote than those reported only in the regional press. In 
column (v), the press coverage given by national newspapers does not have a more marked 
effect than that provided by the regional press, while local news reports about corruption are 
actually good for the incumbent. Column (vi) combines the more than ten news dummies with 
thresholds for national and local news. Again, we find that scandals widely covered by 
national and/or regional newspapers but not by the local media take more votes away from the 
incumbent (10.5%=3.9%+6.6%). If the scandal is also covered by the local media then this 
effect is much lower (5.1%=10.5%-5.4%), although still higher than if the scandal were not 
widely covered by any of the press (3.9%). These results might reflect the fact that newspaper 
competition is usually very low at the local level. Typically, just one newspaper is published 
at the local level, and it is often partly funded by the local council. We speculate that 
government control of local media is highly plausible in these cases. 
[Insert Table 5]   
                                                 
25 We examined the effect for a finer classification of thresholds, but obtained very similar results.  
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Additional DD results: news reports vs judicial charges. Table 5 presents the DD results 
when adding the variables that account for judicial charges to the equation. The main purpose 
of this analysis is to determine whether the results related to scandals and news reports of 
them might just be a reflection of the fact that newspapers only report the most serious cases, 
which are those involving some type of judicial action. The results in Table 5 suggest that 
cases registering a formal accusation by the attorney (that is, cases going to trial) lead to a 
substantial vote loss (around 7% more than cases for which no charges are brought, which are 
the base category, picked up here by the dC dummy). Conviction also results in an additional 
6% vote loss (than in the base case), while cases that are under investigation (but which were 
not taken any further) result in an additional 2% vote loss26. Interestingly, in cases in which 
there were denouncements of corruption from the opposition, the vote share was unaffected 
(in fact, the coefficient is positive, though not statistically significant), while cases already 
filed (and which did not end in conviction) actually resulted in additional votes (around 6%) 
being cast in favour of the incumbent. These results suggest voters do not consider cases of 
corruption raised by the opposition (denouncements) as being credible. A filed case also 
appears to be interpreted as direct evidence that the charge was motivated by an intention to 
harm the opponent. Note also from Table 5 that once the severity of the scandal has been 
accounted for, the effect of a scandal without charges of corruption (picked up by the dC 
dummy) is smaller (1.4% in columns iii). Columns (iv) and (v) present average results for 
municipalities recording some type of corruption charge, excluding those which are not 
ongoing (i.e. denouncements and filed cases). The results suggest that electoral punishment 
varies depending on whether the incumbent is charged or not and also (as above) on press 
coverage. Scandals in which formal charges have been made and for which press coverage is 
                                                 
26 Note that the categories of corruption charges are mutually exclusive, so their effects do not add up. In 
contrast, scandals and charges are not mutually exclusive. Thus we find that there are some scandals with 
charges and all cases with charges are also scandals, since all our cases have been reported by the press 
(involving at least one news report). 
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wide cause a substantial vote loss (12.4%=1.4%+5.7%+5.3%). Scandals already filed or 
denounced and with wide coverage cause a vote loss of just 2% (=1.4 - 5.1% + 5.7%), 
becoming a vote gain when there is little press coverage (3.7%=5.1% - 1.4%).  
Note that in any case, however, scandals and press coverage have an effect on the vote 
even after controlling for judicial action. In column (v) we have allowed for an interaction 
between wide coverage and judicial charges and have found a negative sign, suggesting that 
news reports and charges serve to reinforce each other. Yet, in this case reporting continues to 
have an independent effect on the vote, albeit much lower than previously (4.2% vs. 7.1%). 
[Insert Tables 6 and 7] 
Summary of OLS and DD results with an alternative control group. Both the OLS and 
the DD results are somewhat higher when using the municipalities not-reported as corrupt as 
our control group rather than the non-corrupt municipalities (Table 6). The estimated vote 
loss following a case of corruption rises from 2.1% to 4.8% in the case of OLS, and from 
3.7% to 5.4% in that of DD, although the precision of the estimates is lower when using the 
alternative control group. For widely reported cases, the estimate is also higher when using 
the municipalities not-reported as corrupt as a control group (i.e. the DD results rise from 
8.8% to 11.8% = 5.4%+6.4%, see column (vi) of Table 6). These results are consistent with 
the expected direction of the bias. The control group of municipalities not-reported as corrupt 
presents upwardly biased estimates, while the non-corrupt control group presents 
downwardly biased estimates. Moreover, as the difference between these two estimates is not 
great, the estimated effect of corruption on the incumbents’ vote lies within a fairly narrow 
range.  
Summary of the OLS and DD results for the 2003 elections. The main results for the 
2003 elections are presented in Table 7. Both the OLS and the DD results report estimates 
that are much lower and less precise. In some cases, the coefficients are not even statistically 
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significant. These results would seem to reflect the fact that the first cases of corruption 
appeared just before the 2003 elections, when press reporting and citizen awareness of the 
problem were both much lower than they would be in the following term.  
Robustness checks. We have re-estimated our equations introducing the following 
modifications: (i) we have introduced an additional set of control variables, which includes 
population size dummies (lower than 1000, 1000 to 5000, 5000 to 20000, higher than 20000), 
property tax increase, and increases in current spending, investment and debt; (ii) we have  
modified the definition of the main control group slightly, and have included just those 
municipalities without any recorded incidents of corruption (both in the past and in the future, 
and not just in the past); (iii) we have estimated the effects of an incumbent being found 
corrupt in two consecutive terms (recall these observations were previously eliminated from 
the sample). The results can be summarized as follows: (i) the additional control variables are 
jointly statistically significant, but most are not individually statistically significant and their 
explanatory capacity is low; in all circumstances, however, they do not affect the final results; 
(ii) the change made to the definition of the control group has no discernible effects on our 
coefficients of interest; (iii) incumbents found corrupt on two consecutive occasions are not 
punished (which might be an indication of an omitted popularity bias), probably because they 
were re-elected because of their popularity.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
This paper has studied the effects of the recent upsurge in corruption in Spain on the 
vote polled by local incumbents involved in such scandals. Based on press reports of 
corruption between 1996 and 2009, we have constructed a novel database reporting 
incidences of corruption and news related to charges of bribe-taking in exchange for 
amendments to land use plans. With these data, we have then estimated an equation for an 
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incumbent’s vote share at the 2007 and 2003 municipal elections. Using OLS and ‘difference-
in-differences’ (DD) methods, we show that voters punished corrupt local politicians, albeit 
that while the severity of this punishment was fairly great at the 2007 elections it was more 
modest at the 2003 polls. We are also able to demonstrate that when the press reports widely 
on a case of corruption, politicians are punished more severely. DD results suggest that at the 
2007 elections the mean vote loss following a corruption scandal was around 4% for cases 
with fewer than ten news reports, rising to 9% for cases with more than ten reports (25% of 
all cases). The magnitude of this impact is in line with the moderate effects reported in the 
literature (see, e.g., Peters and Welch, 1980; Welch and Hibbing, 1997). Note, however, that 
to assess the magnitude of the coefficient accurately, we would need to compare it with the 
average margin of victory at Spain’s local elections, which stood at just around 5%. Clearly, 
such a comparison is not strictly reasonable, given that corrupt municipalities typically 
present a higher margin, in our case of around 10%. Yet, while it would appear that many 
corrupt incumbents could afford the downturn suffered by their vote, others would most 
assuredly be ousted from office. When we accounted for the seriousness of the corruption 
charges, the impact was even more marked, with incumbents exposed to wide scale press 
coverage losing around 12% of their vote27 . Fundación Alternativas (2008) reports that 
around 30% of the incumbents accused of corruption before the 2007 polls were in fact ousted 
from office. Our results, therefore, are not inconsistent with these figures. 
Our findings also show that not all types of corruption charges have a negative impact 
on the incumbent’s vote. Thus, accusations or cases filed by the opposition or civil society 
and not investigated by the judiciary actually result in the incumbent receiving more votes. 
This suggests that, in some instances, corruption scandals are perceived by the electorate as 
attempts by the opposition parties to inflict harm on the incumbent and that such accusations 
                                                 
27 This was the case for just 10% of all corrupt incumbents: 25% (scandals with wide press coverage) x 
58% (the scandals involved corruption charges) x 69% (the case has not been filed and/or is not the result 
of accusations from the opposition or civil society). 
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are unfounded. The inclusion of such cases with other more credible accusations goes some 
way to explaining why previous assessments of the impact of corruption on the vote in Spain 
conclude that there was no effect (Fundación Alternativas, 2007).  
Likewise, a failure to consider the intensity of press reporting also helps to explain this 
conclusion. Our results, moreover, suggest that press reporting is not simply an indicator of 
the seriousness of a case, as measured by the type of legal proceedings initiated. Even after 
controlling for legal charges, press coverage has an independent effect on the vote, with wide 
press coverage intensifying the effect of judicial action. This suggests the press and the 
judiciary have a complementary role in making voters aware of corruption. In the initial stage, 
the press breaks a story about corruption, thereby raising voter awareness and, at the same 
time, facilitating subsequent judicial action. In the second stage, the press plays a role as a 
disseminator of information regarding the results of the judicial investigation28.  
The results for the 2003 elections show a much lower impact, which lends further 
weight to the argument that press reporting is a relevant factor in fighting corruption. It was 
not until newspapers began turning their attention to the phenomenon (primarily following the 
2007 elections) that voters were aware of the situation (recall Figures 1 and 2), while the 
punishments imposed were only substantial in cases that received wide press coverage. Our 
results also show that national and regional newspapers provide press coverage that is 
effective in fighting corruption, while coverage by local newspapers tends to be ineffective. 
These results are cause for concern, since it suggests that the role of the press in fighting 
corruption is limited to cases that are of sufficient interest for regional and national audiences 
only. This would seem to have been the case recently, with corruption being a by-product of 
the massive real estate boom throughout much of Spain. However, it is not clear that the 
                                                 
28 Note that these results identify an additional role for the judiciary in the fight against corruption and one 
not commonly captured in the literature. Most papers assume that the judiciary’s role is the punishment of 
corrupt politicians (see, e.g., Alt and Lassen, 2008). However, in Spain we find that the judiciary can help 
clarify which corruption scandals are in fact serious and, thus, worthy of the electorate’s attention, thereby 
increasing the effectiveness of the voting mechanism. 
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regional and national press will continue to show an interest in covering more localized cases 
of corruption in the future.  
30
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Figure 1:  
% Respondents saying ‘corruption and fraud’ are among 
 the three worst problems faced by the country, Sep-2001 to Dec-2008 
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Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas  (CIS): Barómetro, 
several years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2  
% Respondents saying ‘politicians & political parties’ are among  
the three worst problems faced by the country, Jan-1995 to Dec-2008 
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Table 1: 
Nº of corruption cases vs. nº of corruption scandals  
  Corruption reported (=Scandals) 
  
Jan-1996   
June-1999 
July-1999  
May-2003
June-2003 
May-2007 
June-2007 
 Nov-2009
July-1999 
 May-2007 
Jan-1996 
 Nov-2007 
June-1991  
May-1995 6 (3) 7 (5) 1 (1) --.-- 8 (6) 14 (9) 
June-1995 
Jun-1999 14 (7) 10 (8) 8 (2) --.-- 18 (10) 32 (17) 
July–1999 
May-2003 --.-- 227 (212) 31 (17) 30 (26) 258 (229) 288 (255) 
June-2003 
May-2007 --.-- --.-- 307 (224) 101 (49) 307 (224) 408 (273) 
June-2007 
Nov-2009 --.-- --.-- --.-- 72 (60) --.-- 72 (60) 
C
or
ru
pt
io
n 
oc
cu
rs
  (
=
C
as
es
) 
July-1999 
May-2007 --.-- 227 (212) 338 (241) 131 (75) 565 (453) 696 (528) 
 
June-1991  
Nov-2009 20 (10) 244 (225) 347 (244) 203 (135) 591 (469) 814 (614) 
Notes: (1) Both number of cases and scandals refer to the number of municipalities affected, (2) Corruption 
cases = recorded during the term in which the corrupt act originating the scandal occurred. (3) Scandals = 
recorded during the term the press reported the case. (4) In brackets we show the number of observations 
after excluding: a) those municipalities where corruption happened in a period before that in which the 
scandal was reported and the incumbent was not the same; b) those municipalities that have been involved in 
cases of corruption in the past (these are the criteria used in building our ‘treated’ group). (5) In bold are the 
scandals used in the empirical analysis, and in bold and italics the cases used to build the alternative control 
group based on municipalities that are corrupt but where corruption was reported after the elections. 
Source: Fundación Alternativas (2007) and authors’ own data search in MyNews. 
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                    Table 2: 
    Descriptive statistics. 1999-2003 & 2003-07 terms. 
Variable Mean  S.D. Max Min 
Corruption  (dC=1) (4) 0.050 0.218 1 0 
Corruption News(4) 10.434 22.584 208 1 
More than 5 News Reports (4) 0.324 0.469 1 0 
More than 10 News Reports (4) 0.253 0.402 1 0 
More than 20 News Reports (4)  0.124 0.329 1 0 
Local News(4) 1.294 5.523 87 0 
National News(4) 3.983 12.509 158 0 
Local Scandal(4) 0.229 0.421 1 0 
National Scandal(4) 0.468 0.499 1 0 
More than 2 Local News Reports (4) 0.103 0.305 1 0 
More than 5 National News Reports (4) 0.160 0.367 1 0 
Vote share(1) 0.556 0.106 0.851 0.354 
Incumbent in t-1(1) 0.734 0.564 1 0 
Coalition(1) 0.356 0.478 1 0 
Population growth(2) 0.041 0.169 -0.237 2.650 
Unemployment growth(3) 0.004 0.014 -0.078 0.371 
Definitions: Corruption  = 1 if a corruption scandal occurred during the term, 0 otherwise. Corruption 
News= number of news reports related to the scandals occurring during the term. More than X News 
Reports = 1 If Corruption News Reports > X. Local News = number of news stories reported by local 
newspapers. National News = number of news stories reported by national newspapers. Local Scandal = 
1 if a corruption scandal is reported by a local newspaper. National Scandal = 1 if a corruption scandal 
is reported by a national newspaper. More than X Local (National) News Reports = 1 If Local 
(National)  News Reports > X. Vote share = vote for the incumbent party/parties/total vote. Incumbent 
in t-1 = 1 if the same party or a coalition were also incumbents in t-1. Coalition = 1 if the mayor’s party 
does not have a majority of seats in the city council. Population growth = (pop. in t – pop. in t-4)/pop. in 
t-4. Unemployment growth = (unemp. in t – unemp. in t-4)/pop. in t-4.  
Data sources: (1) Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Public Administrations; (2)  National Institute of 
Statistics (www.ine.es), (3) Social Security Register, (4) Fundación Alternativas and authors’ own 
elaboration using MyNews.  
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Table 3 
Effect of corruption scandals on incumbents’ vote share.  
OLS & DD estimates. 2007 elections. 
 OLS DD 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
Corruption (dC=1 if scandal) -0.021 
(-2.88)*** 
-0.027 
(-3.08)*** 
-0.023 
(-3.22)*** 
-0.028 
(-3.55)*** 
-0.036 
(-2.66)** 
-0.037 
(-2.44)** 
-0.037 
(-2.10)** 
-0.038 
(-2.32)** 
Incumbent vote share in  t-1 0.565 
(12.36) *** 
0.584 
(13.84)*** 
0.568 
(16.76) *** 
0.592 
(17.57) *** 
0.590 
(11.06)** 
0.200 
(12.56)** 
0.201 
(2.44)*** 
0.185 
(2.11)*** 
Incumbent in t-1 --.-- --.-- 0.029 (2.51)** 
0.028 
(2.61)** --.-- --.-- 
0.082 
(4.59)** 
0.085 
(4.70)** 
Coalition  --.-- --.-- 0.028 (3.66)*** 
0.038 
(5.39)*** --.-- --.-- 
0.033 
(9.48)*** 
0.036 
(10.18)*** 
Population growth --.-- --.-- 0.004 (2.50)** 
0.004 
(2.34)** --.-- --.-- 
0.001 
(1.26) 
0.001 
(1.37) 
Unemployment growth --.-- --.-- -0.011 (-3.62)*** 
-0.010 
(-3.44)*** --.-- --.-- 
-0.023 
(-5.94)*** 
-0.023 
(-5.68)*** 
R2 0.147 0.178 0.164 0.202 0.112 0.123 0.119 0.148 
F-stat. (All variables) 84.00[0.000] 30.53 [0.000] 33.96 [0.000] 44.76 [0.000] 11.19 [0.000] 8.55 [0.000] 6.39 [0.000] 12.70 [0.000] 
F-stat. (Region × Party f.e.) --.-- 11.52 [0.000] --.-- 10.33 [0.000] --.-- 
6.28 [0.000] --.-- 7.72 [0.000] 
F-stat. (Additional controls) --.-- --.-- 16.05 [0.000] 15.57 [0.000] --.-- --.-- 5.33 [0.000] 6.23 [0.000] 
Region × Party fixed effects  NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Additional controls NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Notes:  (1) Dependent variable is the incumbent’s party/parties vote share, in the OLS case, and the increase in the vote share between two consecutive 
elections in the DD estimation; (2) dC=1 if a corruption scandal involving the incumbent was reported during the 2003-07 term; (3) Control group are 
non-corrupt municipalities; Number of municipalities in the control group is 4360; Number of municipalities with dC=1 is 241; Number of observations 
is 4601; (4) Region × Party effects are allowed to differ between terms in the DD estimation; (5) t-statistics in parenthesis; p-values in brackets; ***, ** & 
* = statistically significant at the 99, 95 and 90% levels. (6) Robust standard errors. (7) F-stat. (All variables) = test of joint statistical significance of all 
variables; F-stat. (Region × Party effects) = test of statistical significance of the time × party × year dummies; F-stat. (Additional controls) = test of 
statistical significance of control variables included in addition to the incumbent vote share in t-1. 
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Table 4 
Effect of corruption news on incumbents’ vote share.  
DD estimates. 2007 elections. 
 Number of news reports Type of newspaper 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Corruption (dC=1 if scandal) 
  
-0.028 
(-2.12)** 
-0.030 
(-2.44)*** 
-0.027 
(-2.48)*** 
-0.036 
(-3.00)*** 
-0.038 
(-2.70)*** 
-0.039 
(-2.50)*** 
Corruption News  
 
-0.002 
(-2.47)** 
--.-- --.-- --.-- -0.002 
(-1.98)** 
--.-- 
More than 5 News Reports  
 
--.-- -0.002 
(-0.130) 
--.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 
More than 10 News Reports 
 
--.-- -0.071 
(-2.20)** 
-0.061 
(-2.27)*** 
--.-- --.-- -0.066 
(-2.88)*** 
More than 20 News Reports 
 
--.-- -0.010 
(-0.34) 
--.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 
Local scandal  
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- 0.007 
(0.45) 
--.-- --.-- 
National scandal  
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- -0.001 
(0.24) 
--.-- --.-- 
Local news  
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.003 
(3.20)*** 
--.-- 
National news 
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.001 
(0.040) 
--.-- 
More than 2 Local News Reports 
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.054 
(3.18)*** 
More than 5 National News Reports  
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.001 
(0.08) 
R2 0.154 0.145 0.146 0.147 0.145 0.143 
F-stat. (All variables) 14.45 [0.000] 13.70 [0.000] 15.03 [0.000] 12.33 [0.000] 13.42 [0.000] 13.78 [0.000] 
      Notes:  (1) See Table 3. (2) All the estimations include the same controls as in Table 2 column (viii). 
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Table 5: 
Effect of scandals vs. judicial charges on incumbents’ vote share.  
DD estimates. Non-corrupt as control group. 2007 elections.  
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Corruption (dC=1 if scandal) 
  
-0.018 
(-1.45) 
-0.018 
(-1.68)* 
-0.014 
(-1.93)* 
-0.014 
(-2.21)** 
-0.014 
(-1.71)* 
Corruption News  
 
--.-- -0.002 
(-1.54) 
--.-- --.-- --.-- 
More than 10 News Reports 
 
--.-- --.-- -0.059 
(-2.25)** 
-0.057 
(-2.33)** 
-0.028 
(-1.75)* 
Filed 
 
0.063 
(2.28)** 
0.062 
(2.52)** 
0.060 
(2.47)** 
--.-- --.-- 
Denounced 
 
0.048 
(1.22) 
0.048 
(1.23) 
0.048 
(1.21) 
--.-- --.-- 
Filed or Denounced --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.051 
(1.76)* 
0.050 
(1.82)* 
Investigation 
 
-0.022 
(-3.65)*** 
-0.022 
(-3.43)*** 
-0.022 
(-3.33)*** 
--.-- --.-- 
Accusation 
 
-0.071 
(-2.11)** 
-0.073 
(-2.32)** 
-0.070 
(-2.33)** 
--.-- --.-- 
Conviction 
 
-0.057 
(-2.76)*** 
-0.057 
(-2.78)*** 
-0.057 
(-2.91)*** 
--.-- --.-- 
Corruption charges 
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- -0.053 
(-2.21)** 
-0.018 
(-1.99)* 
Charges × More than 10 News Reports 
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- -0.087 
(-2.11)** 
R2 0.172 0.172 0.173 0.175 0.170 
F-stat. (All variables) 16.22 [0.000] 15.25 [0.000] 15.57 [0.000] 15.22 [0.000] 15.33 [0.000] 
Notes:  (1) See Table 3. (2) All the estimations include the same controls as in Table 2, column (viii). (3) Corruption 
charges include only those not filed (=investigations+accusations+convictions). 
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Table 6: 
Effect of corruption scandals on incumbents’ vote share.  
OLS & DD estimates. Alternative control group. 2007 elections. 
OLS DD 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Corruption (dC=1 if scandal) 
  
-0.048 
(-1.58) 
-0.040 
(-1.66)* 
-0.040 
(-1.06) 
-0.054 
(-1.75) * 
-0.055 
(-1.79)* 
-0.054 
(-2.19)** 
Corruption News  
 
--.-- -0.002 
(-1.45) 
--.-- --.-- -0.004 
(-1.32) 
--.-- 
More than 10 News Reports 
 
--.-- --.-- -0.045 
(-2.37) ** 
--.-- --.-- -0.064 
(-1.96)** 
R2 0.119 0.125 0.134 0.104 0.114 0.125 
F-stat. (All variables) 7.10[0.000] 4.91[0.000] 6.54[0.000] 4.56[0.000] 5.54 [0.000] 5.83[0.000]
Notes: (1) See Table 2. (2) All the estimations include the same controls as in Table 3, with the exception of the Region × 
Party effects, which were not statistically significant. (3) The control group comprised municipalities with cases of 
corruption during the 2003-07 term that were reported by the press after the 2007 elections. The number of municipalities 
in the control group is 101; number of municipalities with dC=1 is 241; number of observations is 342. 
 
 
 
Table 7  
Effect of corruption scandals on incumbents’  votes. OLS & DD estimates. 2003 elections. 
OLS DD 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Corruption (dC=1 if scandal) 
  
-0.018 
(-2.33)** 
-0.010 
(-1.66)* 
-0.012 
(-1.78)* 
-0.024 
(-1.99)** 
-0.014 
(-1.29) 
-0.018 
(-1.73)* 
Corruption News  
 
--.-- -0.001 
(-2.09)** 
--.-- --.-- -0.001 
(-2.12)** 
--.-- 
More than 10 News 
 
--.-- --.-- -0.034 
(-1.46) 
--.-- --.-- -0.056 
(-1.27) 
       
R2 0.221 0.234 0.218 0.104 0.101 0.098 
F-stat. (All variables) 10.44[0.000] 9.55[0.000] 8.33[0.000] 4.56[0.000] 2.45 [0.000] 2.90[0.000]
Notes: (1) See Tables 2.(2) All the estimations include the same controls as in Table 3, column (viii). (3) The control 
group are the non-corrupt municipalities; (3) The number of municipalities in the control group is 4655; number of 
municipalities with dC=1 is 212; number of observations is 4732. 
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